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ABSTRACT 
Using cohort-based surface warfare officer (SWO) inventory data from Bureau of 
Naval Personnel, this thesis examines possible correlation between SWO 
retention and the economy, as well as the effect of SWO career pay (SWOCP) 
on SWO retention. Multivariate regression is used as the main tool of analysis.  
I find that the unemployment rate shows a positive correlation with SWO 
retention. There was insufficient evidence to support the relationship between 
SWOCP and retention. The female population does yield some significant results 
independent of the mixed and male population.  
The findings indicate more research on non-monetary determinants of the 
SWO retention is necessary, a policy re-assessment of SWOCP may be 
warranted, and female retention differs from male retention and should be 
assessed further.  
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
A.  PURPOSE ............................................................................................ 1 
B.  EXPECTED BENEFITS ....................................................................... 2 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................... 2 
D.  THESIS SCOPE ................................................................................... 2 
E.  METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 3 
F.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW ........................................................................ 3 
II.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION .................................................................... 5 
A.  SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER ........................................................ 5 
B.  SWO CAREER PATH .......................................................................... 6 
1.  Sea Tours ................................................................................. 7 
2.  Shore Tours .............................................................................. 8 
C.  SWO VOLUNTARY SEPARATION DECISION POINTS ..................... 8 
D.  COMPENSATION ................................................................................ 9 
1.  Base Pay ................................................................................... 9 
2.  Allowances ............................................................................. 10 
3.  Incentives ............................................................................... 11 
4.  Retirement .............................................................................. 13 
E.  SUMMARY ......................................................................................... 14 
III.  LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................ 15 
A.  ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING I AND II ..................................... 15 
B.  PREDICTED EFFECTIVENESS OF SWOCIP ................................... 18 
C.  SWO RETENTION MODEL ............................................................... 18 
D.  EFFECT OF SWOCP ON QUALITY .................................................. 19 
E.  FACTORS IMPACTING JUNIOR SWO RETETION .......................... 20 
F.  PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE SWO INCENTIVES ............................. 21 
IV.  RETENTION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .................................................... 23 
A.  RETENTION DATA DESCRIPTION .................................................. 23 
B.  TREATMENT OF DATA .................................................................... 23 
1.  Pooled Regression Analysis ................................................. 24 
2.  Assumption in Pooled Regression ...................................... 25 
C.  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT ....................................................... 25 
1.  Hypothesis 1—First Primary Research Question ............... 25 
2.  Hypothesis 2—Second Primary Research Question .......... 26 
3.  Hypothesis 3—Third Primary Research Question .............. 26 
4.  Hypothesis 4—Secondary Research Question ................... 27 
D.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT .................................................................. 27 
1.  Explanatory Independent Variables ..................................... 27 
2.  Univariate Analysis ................................................................ 29 
3.  Multivariate Analysis ............................................................. 30 
a.  Mixed Data Set Analysis ............................................. 30 
 viii
b.  Male Data Set Analysis ............................................... 32 
c.  Female Data Set Analysis ........................................... 34 
d.  Hypothesis 4 Analysis ................................................ 36 
e.  Multivariate Summary ................................................. 37 
E.  RE-EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHESES ............................................. 38 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................. 39 
A.  RECOMMENDATION 1 ..................................................................... 39 
B.  RECOMMENDATION 2 ..................................................................... 42 
C.  RECOMMENDATION 3 ..................................................................... 44 
D.  SUMMARY ......................................................................................... 45 
APPENDIX A.  RETENTION INVENTORY SPREADSHEET .......................... 47 
APPENDIX B.  EXPLANATORY VARIABLE HISTORICAL DATA ................. 49 
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................................................... 53 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  SWO career path (from Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2014) .................. 7 
Figure 2.  Fleet response plan ship cycle (from Department of the Navy, 
2012) .................................................................................................... 7 
Figure 3.  Excerpt of monthly base pay in 2014 (from “Military Pay Tables,” 
n.d.) .................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 4.  2013 Junior Officer SWE survey results comparing general Naval 
career to SWO naval career (from Surface Warfare Enterprise, 
2013) .................................................................................................. 41 
Figure 5.  2013 Junior officer SWE survey results to influencers of decision to 
leave active duty (from Surface Warfare Enterprise, 2013) ................ 41 
Figure 6.  Distribution of female officers in URL communities (from Miller, n.d.) 44 
Figure 7.  Mixed retention data spreadsheet ...................................................... 47 
Figure 8.  Male retention data spreadsheet ........................................................ 47 
Figure 9.  Female retention data spreadsheet .................................................... 47 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Monthly BAH for O-3 with no dependents in 2014—selected areas 
(after “Military Pay Tables,” n.d.) ........................................................ 10 
Table 2.  Monthly COLA for O-3 with no dependents in October 2014—
selected areas (after Overseas Cost of Living Allowances, n.d.) ........ 11 
Table 3.  Combined SWOCP and JSWOCRSB pay table (after Department 
of the Navy, 2012b) ............................................................................ 12 
Table 4.  Payment schedule for SWOCSB (after Department of the Navy, 
2002) .................................................................................................. 12 
Table 5.  Summary of O-4 retirement at 20 YCS for 40 years (from Regular 
military compensation calculator, n.d.) ............................................... 14 
Table 6.  Summary statistics for mixed dataset ................................................. 23 
Table 7.  Summary statistics for male dataset ................................................... 24 
Table 8.  Summary statistics for female dataset ................................................ 24 
Table 9.  Summary statistics for non-binary explanatory economic variables ... 28 
Table 10.  Summary of Pearson Correlation ....................................................... 29 
Table 11.  OLS coefficients and T-stat for mixed data set ................................... 31 
Table 12.  OLS coefficients and T-stat for male data set ..................................... 33 
Table 13.  OLS coefficients and T-stat for female data set .................................. 35 
Table 14.  Summary of expected and observed coefficient signs ........................ 37 
Table 15.  Summary of multivariate analysis ....................................................... 37 
Table 16.  Retention Averages and Standard deviations for Combined Data 
set, Male Dataset and Female Dataset. ............................................. 38 
Table 17.  GDP (after “U.S. GDP Growth Rate by Year,” n.d) and 
unemployment rate from 1994–2013 (after “Labor Force Statistics 
from the Current Population Survey, n.d) ........................................... 49 
Table 18.  Dow Jones Industrial Average data from 1994–2013 (from “Dow 
Jones Industrial Average Yearly Returns,” n.d) .................................. 49 
Table 19.  NASDAQ data from 1994–2013 (from “NASDAQ Composite Index 
Yearly Returns,” n.d.) ......................................................................... 50 
Table 20.  S&P500 data from 1994–2013 (from “S&P 500 Index Yearly 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACOL annualized cost of leaving 
ADSO active duty service obligation 
BAH basic allowance for housing 
BAS basic allowance for sustenance 
COLA cost of living allowance 
DJIA Dow Jones Industrial Average 
DOD Department of Defense 
DoN Department of the Navy 
FITREP fitness report 
FY fiscal year 
JSWOCSB Junior Surface Warfare Officers Critical Skills Bonus 
MSR minimum service requirement 
MTA member trait average 
NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations 
NPRST Navy Personnel Research, Studies and Technology 
NROTC Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps 
OCS Officer Candidate School 
OLS ordinary least squares 
PDR personal discount rate 
RL restricted line 
SWO surface warfare officer  
SWOCP surface warfare officer career pay 
SWOCIP surface warfare officer career incentive pay 
SWOCSB surface warfare officer critical skills bonus 
URL unrestricted line 
YCS years commissioned service 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my thesis advisor and my second reader for their 
knowledge, guidance, and advice throughout the research process.  
I would also like to thank the Conrad Scholar board for their time and 









In the last 20 years, the best retention, at year seven, among U.S. naval 
surface warfare 9officers (SWO), was the 1990 cohort at 44 percent. At an 
estimated training cost of $99,143 per SWO in 2003 dollars (Gavino, 2003), the 
attrition cost in training expense of the 56 percent that voluntarily separated was 
$67,975,691 (2014 dollars). In an attempt to combat low retention, Surface 
warfare officer career pay (SWOCP) was implemented in fiscal year (FY) 2000 
(Department of the Navy, 2000). The best retention year since the inception of 
the SWOCP was cohort 2007 at 43 percent; the training expense for the 57 
percent that voluntarily separated was $49,317,710 (2014 dollars).1 The issue of 
SWO retention has been recognized consistently over the years as a continuing 
concern. According to Vice Admiral Hoewing (2005), “Retention among Surface 
Warfare Community department head (mid-grade) officers, typically with 6–10 
years’ experience, has been a problem since Fiscal Year 1993.” (Hoewing, 2005) 
Beyond the financial implications, retention of SWOs is critical to 
maintaining the capabilities of the Navy and meeting national strategic objectives. 
In his 21st Century Defense Strategy, President Obama specifically states, “we 
will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region,” an area 
encompassing nine of the 10 busiest seaports worldwide (White house, 2012, p. 
2). The 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower illustrates the 
growing need for maritime dominance; over 90 percent of the world trade and 
two-thirds of petroleum trade is transported by sea—a number that has 
quadrupled in the last 40 years (Chief of Naval Operations, 2007). Further 
increases in technology may reduce the manning requirements on naval vessels, 
but highly trained, capable SWOs will always be vital.   
                                            
1 Post 2002 training costs were estimated at $100,877 in 2011 dollars (Macaluso, 2011) 
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To accomplish national objectives and maintain the current fleet, there 
exists an annual requirement for 275 SWO department heads. SWOs attain the 
position of department head at approximately seven years in service. All 
department heads must be “home-grown;” there is no out-source option. Due to 
low retention, a large initial inventory must be introduced to meet the demand at 
year seven. This thesis conducts an analysis to examine possible correlations of 
SWO retention to the economy, SWO career pay (SWOCP), and an interaction of 
the economy and SWOCP.  
B. EXPECTED BENEFITS 
A better understanding of retention and economic correlations can 
increase forecasting ability. This understanding will allow further research to 
assess the model used to shape the force and reduce cost inefficient manpower 
expansions and bottlenecks. Moreover, an investigation of the impact of SWOCP 
on SWO retention is potentially beneficial to policy makers.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Questions 
Is there empirical evidence of a correlation between surface warfare 
officer retention and the economy? 
Is there empirical evidence of a correlation between surface warfare 
officer retention and career pay? 
How does surface warfare officer retention respond to the interaction 
between the economy and career pay? 
Secondary Question 
Do the findings (if any) vary with the male or female SWO population? 
D. THESIS SCOPE 
This thesis focuses only on SWO community retention. While previous 
models referenced in the literature review draw research based on data from 
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other services, communities, and the enlisted population, this thesis focuses on 
SWO retention from 1990–2013.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
Both univariate correlation and multivariate regression are conducted on 
data obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The data consists of yearly 
inventories of SWOs by cohort stratified by gender. Using retention rates as a 
dependent variable, the analysis looks at the effects of economic indicators, 
SWOCP, and the interactions between the economy and SWOCP.  
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis is arranged in five chapters. Chapter I provides a general 
overview of the thesis to include the purpose, research question, scope, and 
methodology.  
Chapter II provides background information on the SWO community 
beginning with an overview of unrestricted line (URL) officers. Next, a description 
of a typical career path to show the sea/shore rotation as well as decision points 
is discussed. Finally, a brief overview of the base compensation as well as 
incentive pays is provided.  
Chapter III reviews the literature beginning with a chronological summary 
of the research on SWO retention. The summary includes applications of the 
annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) method to predict SWOCP effectiveness, an 
economic panel probit model for SWO retention, the effect of SWOCP on quality 
of retention, a summary of factors affecting junior SWO retention, and current 
research alternatives to SWO incentives.  
Chapter IV develops hypotheses and empirically tests the conjectures. 
Empirical findings, interpretations, and explanations are offered.  
Chapter V concludes and provides recommendations.  
 4
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The factors affecting retention in the surface warfare community differ 
greatly from the factors affecting both the civilian workforce as well as other 
communities within the military. To understand both non-monetary and monetary 
factors affecting the community’s retention rates, it is necessary to describe the 
duties associated with the job, career path, decision points, and monetary 
compensations.  
A. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER  
The two overarching categories of officers in the United States Navy are 
restricted line (RL) and unrestricted line (URL) officers. RL officers are not 
eligible for command at sea. Most types of officers fall into this category; 
examples include engineering duty officers, supply corps, intelligence officers, 
medical officers, and public affairs officers. RL officers are not discussed further 
in this thesis and are introduced only to distinguish URL officers (Powers, n.d.).  
The URL officers can be described as the combat communities. The four 
categories of URL officers include submarine warfare, special warfare, naval 
aviation, and surface warfare (Powers, n.d.). Each officer receives job-specific 
training within his or her community; transfers require applications and are 
closely monitored by both the releasing and gaining communities.  
The surface warfare officer’s (SWO) primary duty is the operation and 
maintenance of ships at sea. A surface warfare career can be divided into 
several time periods prior to 20 years of commissioned service (YCS): division 
officer (YCS 1-7), department head (YCS 8-12), post-department head (YCS 13-
18), and the penultimate goal of the SWO career path: command at sea (YCS 
18+).  
The division officer period is non-job specific; a division officer can serve 
in the operations, weapons, combat systems, or engineering departments 
depending on the requirements of the ship assigned. Division officers will not 
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only become competent in the job they are assigned, but will work to achieve the 
surface warfare officer qualification no later than the 22-month mark onboard 
their first ship (Department of the Navy, 2011). The SWO qualification includes 
proficiency in ship handling, engineering systems, combat systems on the ship 
assigned, as well as an intense knowledge of naval supply, administration, 
history, and all other naval platforms (Department of the Navy, 2011).  
The department head phase, alternatively, is job specific. A SWO at this 
point in his or her career will be assigned as the head of one of the four 
departments (weapons and combat systems are combined on some ship types). 
Post-department has many divergent paths; it includes the traditional command-
at-sea path as well as specialty career paths to include: anti-terrorism/force 
protection, anti-submarine warfare, missile defense, mine warfare specialist, 
shore installation management, and strategic sealift (Department of the Navy, 
2004). 
B. SWO CAREER PATH 
The SWO career path is highly regimented. A division officer’s first two 
tours will be sea tours; division officer sea tours are followed by a shore tour 
before committing to be a department head, which entails further naval training 
and two additional sea tours. The path is uniform for all SWOs until 
approximately year 14 when the special mission (SM) career path is introduced 
(Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2014). Figure 1 from the Naval Personnel 
Command shows the SWO career path. The years are listed above with the 
expected rank listed below. Green represents shore tours, blue represents sea 
tours, and yellow represents naval training.  
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Figure 1.  SWO career path (from Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2014) 
1. Sea Tours 
Sea tours are unpredictable for many reasons. Every ship is at a different 
point in a recurring cycle and that cycle can be affected by domestic or 
international affairs—both politically driven and natural events. The ship cycle is 
described in the fleet response plan which designs a 27-month cycle as shown in 
Figure 2 (Department of the Navy, 2012a). 
 
Figure 2.  Fleet response plan ship cycle (from Department of the Navy, 
2012a) 
There are three main phases in the 27-month cycle and they are summarized as 
follows: 
 Training/Certification (11 months). This phase is broken up into a 
basic stage, an intermediate stage, and an advance stage. Certain 
requirements must be met before moving forward, so the time 
spent overall in this phase may be shortened or extended based 
upon an individual ship’s performance. During the 
training/certification phase, underway periods are erratic and can 
last from a one-day excursion to a one-month underway.  
 Sustainment/Deployment (11 months). The beginning of the 
sustainment phase often involves workups with other deploying 
ships and varies with the location, participants, and time underway. 
Deployments are shown in Figure 2 as six months and are slightly 
more predictable both in timing and duration. However, not due to a 
policy change but influenced by world events, the average length of 
deployments have increased to an average length of eight months 
as reported in the Navy Times in 2013 (Fellman, 2013). 
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 Maintenance (five months). The maintenance phase is a period to 
address material issues or conduct life cycle replacements of 
equipment. This period can fluctuate from the five months shown in 
Figure 2 to an extended 18-month dry dock period depending on 
total life cycle of the ship.  
Additionally, the ships can be re-tasked based on national priorities, 
emergencies, and humanitarian relief, among other reasons. These factors result 
in an unpredictable schedule and vary for each individual based on both their 
ship and reporting date.  
2. Shore Tours 
One can argue, Shore tours are designed to be more predictable than sea 
tours. They include support commands, such as naval schooling or training 
groups, as well as civilian education opportunities. The variety of shore tours is 
numerous, but the uniting factor is long-range predictability and few require any 
underway periods. Generally shore tours are not experienced until after two sea 
tours, or four to five years.  
C. SWO VOLUNTARY SEPARATION DECISION POINTS 
Voluntary separation is the point at which an officer can choose to leave 
active service; it is analogous to re-enlistment decision for enlisted service 
members though structurally different. According to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, all 
commissioned officers will serve a minimum service requirement (MSR) initial 
period of six to eight years. However, that includes both active duty service and 
reserve service (Armed Forces, 2010). The active duty service obligation (ADSO) 
varies based upon method of entrance. There are three main methods of 
entrance into the SWO community.2 The U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) requires 
five years active duty and thee years reserve duty (Armed Forces, 2010c). Naval 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarships require four years active 
duty and four years reserve duty (Armed Forces 2010b). Officer Candidate 
                                            
2 Enlisted to officer programs are not listed. Due to the previous service, the years of 
continuous service (YCS) are increased and change the eligibility for some incentives as well as 
career paths and retention rates. 
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School (OCS) has a ADSO of three years (Armed Forces, 2010). The end of this 
initial obligation is the first decision point for voluntary separation. As seen in 
Figure 1, both the four and five year points will occur within an already started 
tour. As a commissioned officer, acceptance of orders incurs the time obligation 
for the orders and must be completed.  
The second voluntary separation decision point occurs after the 
department head tour at the end of year 12. However, military retirement is 
vested at year 20. At year 12, the quite lucrative military retirement is over 50 
percent vested and retention at this point is not the focus of this thesis. For 
comparison purposes, the average retention from YCS 7–12 for cohorts 1990–
2002 is 59 percent as compared to the YCS 1-7 retention of 39 percent for the 
same cohorts.  
The third major voluntary separation decision point occurs at year 15 upon 
completion of the surface warfare critical skills bonus (discussed in section 
II.D.3). The average retention from YCS 12–15 for cohorts 1990–1999 is 87 
percent. Retention at this point is not the focus of this thesis.  
D. COMPENSATION 
Compensation for the military includes a variety of factors. There are 
monetary factors that are discussed in detail in this thesis, as well as non-
monetary compensation in the form of healthcare, services, and tax exemptions.  
1. Base Pay 
Base pay is a function of rank and years of service. It is uniform across all 
military branches and does not vary based upon job. It is updated yearly by 
executive order; approval for 2014 pay was outlined in Executive Order 13655, 
enacted 23 December 2013. Base pay is approximately 50 percent of the 
monetary compensation (“Base Pay,” n.d.). An excerpt from the 2014 base pay is 
shown in Figure 3 for pay grades O-2 to O-4.  
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Figure 3.  Excerpt of monthly base pay in 2014 (from “Military Pay Tables,” 
n.d.) 
2. Allowances 
There are three main types of allowances for all service members: 
housing, subsistence, and cost of living. For housing, service members can 
reside in government provided quarters. When they are unavailable, or when the 
option exists, there is a basic allowance for housing (BAH) to offset the cost of 
housing (“Basic Allowance for Housing,” n.d.). Some areas may have a hybrid 
where government housing is privately ran and only a portion of BAH is received 
(“Basic Allowance for Housing,” n.d.). BAH is determined by geographical 
location, pay grade, and dependency status (“Basic Allowance for Housing,” 
n.d.). Housing allowance is slightly different overseas and is called basic housing 
allowance (“Basic Allowance for Housing,” n.d.). An example for an O-3 with no 
dependents for the fleet concentration areas is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Monthly BAH for O-3 with no dependents in 2014—selected 
areas (after “Military Pay Tables,” n.d.) 
Fleet concentration area BAH (O-3, no dependents) 
Norfolk, VA $1,671 
San Diego, CA $2,163 
Jacksonville, FL $1,548 
Everett, WA $1,623 
Pearl Harbor, HI $2,865 
 
Basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) is designed to offset the cost of 
meals. It originated when the military provided rations, and is based on the USDA 
food cost index (“Basic Allowance for Subsistence,” n.d.). It is a flat allowance but 
differs for enlisted and officers. In 2014, it was a monthly payment of $323.87 for 
enlisted and $223.04 for officers (“Basic Allowance for Subsistence,” n.d.).  
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The third type of allowance is the cost of living allowance (COLA) 
designed to offset the high cost of living in certain locations by increasing the 
service members’ purchasing power (“Overseas Cost of Living Allowances,” 
n.d.). A cost of living index is created by comparing the cost of goods 
domestically to the cost in different regions; this retail price schedule uses a 
market basket of 120 goods and services (“Overseas Cost of Living Allowances,” 
n.d.). This occurs in overseas locations but also applies to Alaska and Hawaii. An 
example for an O-3 with no dependents for the common concentration areas is 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Monthly COLA for O-3 with no dependents in October 
2014—selected areas (after Overseas Cost of Living 
Allowances, n.d.) 
Concentration area COLA (O-3, no dependents) 
Anchorage, AL $650 
Bahrain $693 
Hawaii (Oahu) $924 
Naples, Italy $1,098 
Yokosuka, Japan $1,040 
 
3. Incentives 
There are retention and skill based incentives within each community. This 
section discusses those applicable to SWOs. The first incentive is the surface 
warfare career pay (SWOCP). SWOCP was first implemented in fiscal year 
2000.3 SWOCP is a sum of $50,000; the first $10,000 is paid to the individual 
upon application and meeting all requirements, the next $10,000 is paid at the 
start of Department Head School, and the following three $10,000 installments 
are paid on the anniversaries of the start of Department Head School 
(Department of the Navy, 2000).  
                                            
3 Prior to SWOCP inception, the proposed version was referred to as surface warfare officer 
career incentive pay (SWOCIP). In order to distinguish research forecasting the effects of the 
bonus as compared to research analyzing effects post-inception, SWOCIP will be used when 
referencing the proposed incentive and SWOCP when addressing the implremented bonus. The 
differentiation is necessary due to different monetary amounts and pay schedules. 
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Announced in 2006 and beginning in FY2007, the junior SWO critical skills 
bonus (JSWOCSB) was introduced in the amount of $25,000 (Department of the 
Navy, 2006). Prior to 2012, SWOCP and JSWOCSB were separate programs 
and were applied for individually; JSWOCP was an additional $15,000 on the 
anniversary of the sixth year of continuous service (YCS) and two $5,000 
installments on the anniversary of the seventh and eight YCS (Department of the 
Navy, 2006). In 2012, both incentives were combined and resulted in the 
payment schedule shown in Table 3 (Department of the Navy, 2012b). 
Table 3.   Combined SWOCP and JSWOCRSB pay table (after 
Department of the Navy, 2012b) 
Payment Requirement 
$10,000 Meeting all eligibility requirements and application 
$10,000 YCS 6 anniversary 
$10,000 YCS 7 anniversary 
$15,000 YCS 8 anniversary 
$15,000 YCS 9 anniversary 
$15,000 YCS 10 Anniversary 
 
Announced in 2002 and commencing in FY2003 is the surface warfare 
officer critical skills bonus (SWOCSB). This bonus is applicable to all SWOs who 
reach the pay grade of O-4, lieutenant commander (LCDR). It consists of 
$46,000 and a commitment of active service through YCS 15. The payment 
schedule is shown in Table 4 (Department of the Navy, 2002). 
Table 4.   Payment schedule for SWOCSB (after Department of the 
Navy, 2002) 
Payment Requirement 
$22,000 2nd anniversary of LCDR 
$12,000 3rd anniversary of LCDR 
$12,000 4th anniversary of LCDR 
 
Beginning FY2001 and cancelled in FY2011, there was a senior SWO 
critical skills bonus. This bonus was available to pay grades O-5 and O-6 for an 
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annual payment of $15,000 and $20,000 respectively. This is no longer available 
to SWOs (Department of the Navy, 2012b).  
4. Retirement 
Retirement compensation for service members has both monetary and 
non-monetary components. The non-monetary benefits include healthcare for the 
member as well as dependents, commissary privileges, and base exchange 
services. The monetary benefits become fully vested for service members at 20 
years of service. Retirement compensation is available immediately upon 
retirement. The retirement pay consists of an annuity of 2.5 percent multiplied by 
years of service (to a maximum of 30 years) multiplied by the highest three-year 
average of basic pay (“Active Duty Retirement,” n.d.).  
As an example of monetary retirement compensation, a LCDR retiring in 
2014 would have a base pay average from 2012–2014 of $82,334. With 20 years 
of service, that would be yearly unadjusted annuity of $41,167. Assuming a 
retirement age 44, and inflation rate of two percent, the non-discounted 
cumulative value after 40 years would be $3,104,013 before taxes as 
summarized in Table 5 and calculated from the http://militarypay.defense.gov 
website.4 Using the same interest rate of two percent, the present value at the 







                                            
4 The table assumes a 30 percent tax rate. 
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Table 5.   Summary of O-4 retirement at 20 YCS for 40 years (from 




The preceding information is designed to give an overview of SWOs to 
gain understanding of potential retention issues. A summary of the significant 
factors include: 
 The overall structure of the career path; it is specific and options 
are limited.  
 A glimpse of quality of life issues based on the unpredictability of 
sea tours, which constitute the first five years of the SWO career 
path and influences the first decision point. 
 A summary of decision points for SWOs; there are three main exit 
points and the most pertinent to this thesis is at YCS 4–7, or post 
division officer.  
 Monetary compensation for SWOs includes base pay, allowances, 
incentives and retirement. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following is a chronological summary of studies in military retention 
applicable to SWO retention. I begin with Warner and Goldberg’s (1984) model of 
retention that examined military and civilian monetary streams and monetized 
non-monetary factors. Next, two separate models are presented to predict the 
effectiveness of monetary incentives on retention. SWOCP is used when 
addressing the current bonus and SWOCIP is used in addressing the analysis of 
the proposed incentive. After the inception of SWOCP, an effect on quality is 
analyzed as well as the factors affecting retention. Finally, current research 
involves auction theory to both increase the quantity and quality of military officer 
retention at a reduced total cost.  
The purpose of this review is to illustrate the gaps the primary and 
secondary research questions of this thesis is designed to fill.  
A. ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING I AND II 
In 1984, Warner and Goldberg developed the annualized cost of leaving 
(ACOL) framework to forecast voluntary separation from military service. The 
method attempts to take both monetary and non-monetary factors into 
consideration. This is especially applicable in naval service as deployed sea 
rotations have non-monetary factors not found in a number of other employment 
options (Warner & Goldberg, 1984).  
The theory behind the model is that a rational decision maker will assess 
the future monetary and non-monetary outlays in the military compared to all 
future comparable outlays in the civilian marketplace. A rational decision maker 
will then choose to voluntarily separate when the civilian outlays are greater than 
the military outlays (Warner & Goldberg, 1984). In determining the methodology, 
Warner and Goldberg (1984) define the following factors: 
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jM   =  the individual’s expected military pay in each future year of service, 
  1,j s  , where s  equals the maximum allowable additional 
years of service. 
jnR   =  yearly retired pay the individual will receive after n more years of 
service, j = n + 1,….T, where T equals life expectancy 
0jW   =  future civilian earnings stream the individual expects to receive if he 
leaves the military immediately, j = 1,...,T 
jnW   =  future civilian earnings stream the individual expects to receive if he 
leaves the military after n more years of service, j = n +1,...,T 
p   = individual’s yearly discount rate 
Warner and Goldberg (1984) define a “taste-factor” for non-monetary 
factors for both military and civilian life: 
m   =  annual monetary equivalent of non-monetary aspects of military life 
c   =  annual monetary equivalent of non-monetary aspects of civilian life 
Using these factors, they propose that an individual will choose to remain in 
military for n more years when 
 0
1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 p)
n T Tj m jn jn c j c
j j j
j j n j
M R W W
p p
  
   
           (1) 
where the first summation is the discounted present value of military monetary 
and non-monetary factors for n years (Warner & Goldberg, 1984). The second 
summation represents the present value of military retirement and the value of 
civilian pay after n more years of military service. The right side summation 
represents the present value of the civilian pay as well as the civilian non-
monetary taste factor if he or she leaves military right now. This equation can be 
simplified to  
   0
1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 p)
n T T Tj m jn j jo j
c mj j j jn
j j n j j
M R W W W
p p pC
  
    
             (2) 











    (3) 
where  is the net taste factor of civilian life over military life. Dividing both sides 






j  , the decision for choosing to remain in the military 













  (4) 
Warner and Goldberg’s (1984) equation 4 shows an individual will remain 
in the navy for n more years as long as the present value of the cost of leaving 
the navy ( nA ) is greater than the net taste factor. In applying their model to 
enlisted naval personnel at their first re-enlistment point, military pay streams 
estimated from promotion probabilities, and average pay grades at the end of 
one year of service, Warner and Goldberg found the ACOL explained “much of 
the variation in the probability of reenlisting” (1984, p. 32).  
In 1991, Smith, Sylwester, and Villa analyzed the original ACOL model 
and developed the ACOL II model. They noted that military members 
approaching their second decision point would have a higher taste-factor for the 
military than a sample at their first re-enlistment decision point because those 
with low taste-factors for military life would have already voluntarily separated 
(Smith, Sylwester, & Villa, 1991). To account for this change as members pass 
through decision points, they separated the non-observed factors for both military 
and civilian (
,m c ), into a fixed taste and a changing one-term variance taste. 
Specifically, they divided   into two factors,   and   where   includes the 
previous taste factor and   is the one-term error factor to account for the 
variances in a multi-decisional model (Smith et al., 1991).   
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B. PREDICTED EFFECTIVENESS OF SWOCIP 
In 1996, the SAG Corporation conducted an economic analysis of the 
proposed SWOCIP (Mackin & Darling, 1996). At that time, there was no 
published model for SWO retention that could be found in the literature. Utilizing 
pay elasticity and data from two other URL communities—aviation and nuclear 
(surface and subsurface) they developed an inventory projection model for SWO 
retention. Mackin and Darling found that a five year, $10,000 bonus starting at 
the fifth year of continuous service would result in an increase of voluntary 
retention by 10.5 percent based on nuclear officer pay elasticity and 10.52 
percent based on aviation elasticity (1996).   
In 1997, Nosal conducted an analysis of the proposed SWOCIP using the 
ACOL II method. In conducting his research, he used a personal discount rate 
(PDR) of 10 percent. He calculated the ACOL both with and without the proposed 
SWOCIP; he then created a multivariate model finding the ACOL variable was 
“statistically significant and positive in its effect on the probability of staying in the 
military” (Nosal, 1997, p. 11). Using this data, he predicted an increase of 1.08 
percent in retention rates from years of service (YOS) six to ten. For an individual 
year, Nosal calculated a maximum increase in retention from SWOCIP in YOS 
six at 2.42 percent (1997). YOS six was found to be the maximum because it 
was assumed to be the first year the bonus was available and the marginal effect 
of bonuses decreases over time. The proposed SWOCIP program in 1997 was 
$50,000 with one half given as a lump sum in the first year, and the remaining in 
four annual payments of $6,250 (Nosal, 1997). This is not how SWOCP was 
ultimately implemented (Department of the Navy, 2000).  
C. SWO RETENTION MODEL 
In 2002, the SAG Corporation in conjunction with the Navy Personnel 
Research, Studies and Technology (NPRST) created a model of SWO retention 
(Mackin, Darling, Hasan, & Crayton, 2002). It examined the ACOL methods I and 
II, using the methodology of comparing monetary and non-monetary outlays for 
 19
the choice of remaining in the military for n more years versus leaving 
immediately (Mackin et al., 2002). They created a multivariate model and drew a 
number of conclusions.  
First, in regard to pay elasticity, they found a one percent increase in total 
monetary compensation would increase the probability of retention at the first 
decision point defined at the end of ADSO (approximately 5–7 YCS) by 0.75 
percent. However, forecasting the effect of a $50,000 bonus led to substantially 
increased retention of 15.7 percent (Mackin et al., 2002). Mackin et al. 
acknowledge that this is most likely overstated because the model was not 
designed to attach any future obligation to the bonus (2002).  
In regard to unemployment effects, they found a positive correlation; a 10 
percent increase in the unemployment rate increases the probability of retention 
by 1.4 percent at the first decision point (Mackin et al., 2002). They used the 
annual national unemployment rate for all individuals 16 and above.  
The model also assessed two quality of life measures: the ship type of the 
initial assignment (at YCS 1) and the length of the department head tour, which is 
the tour following the first decision point if the member chooses to remain in the 
Navy (Mackin et al., 2002). It was found that assignment to a specific ship 
platform (destroyer, frigate and cruiser) was insignificant. However, length of 
department head tour, which is typically two 18-month tours for a total of 36 
months, was found to be significant; a four month increase in department head 
tour length led to a five percent decrease in retention at the first decision point, 
which occurs pre-department head tour (Mackin, et al., 2002).   
D. EFFECT OF SWOCP ON QUALITY 
In 2006, six years after SWOCP implementation and prior to the 
implementation of JSWOCSB, Lorio conducted an analysis of the effect of 
SWOCP on quality. Lorio analyzed the annual performance report for officers 
known as the fitness report (FITREP) for data sets prior to and post SWOCP 
(2006). Service members receive a rating on several performance traits to create 
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a member trait average (MTA) ranging from 1–5. Lorio used the normalized MTA 
for service members against their reporting senior’s cumulative average and then 
weighted the most recent FITREPS (2006).  
Using the FITREP score as a database to measure quality, she was able 
to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in officers that chose 
to remain active duty prior to the inception of SWOCP as compared to those who 
chose to remain active duty after implementation of SWOCP (Lorio, 2006). 
Conducting a multivariate linear regression between the two data sets (pre-
SWOCP and post SWOCP), she found SWOCP had no effect on quality or 
downstream performance. She concluded that SWOCP was not an effective tool 
for affecting the quality of officers retained (Lorio, 2006).  
E. FACTORS IMPACTING JUNIOR SWO RETETION 
In 2002, Clemens published research on influencing factors of SWO 
retention for officers within their ADSO, specifically lieutenant junior grade (O-2) 
and lieutenants (O-3). The primary data set used was the 1999 Department of 
Defense (DOD) survey of active personnel. This data provided 373 male SWOs 
within their ADSO (or less than four or five years depending on their 
commissioning source). Clemens identified 17 variables and utilized a 
multivariate logit model to predict the retention intentions of SWOs within their 
ADSO (2002). He created a binary dependent variable with intent to remain in 
the navy (1) or separate (0). From this he identified several statistically significant 
factors. 
 Lower ranking officers were less likely to stay in the Navy and 
Clemens concludes this may be due to negative work experience 
as a division officer. 
 Family status positively influenced retention; officers with 
dependents were 2 percent more likely to remain in active status.  
 When an officer received the occupation of his or her choice, he or 
she is 13.78 percent more likely to remain active duty. 
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 Satisfaction with military work values including “enjoyment of 
military life, leadership, training, assignments, military values and 
morale” resulted in a 27.29 percent higher likelihood to retain.  
 Satisfaction with military time allocation including “personal time, 
workloads, deployments and manning” resulted in a 10.51 percent 
higher probability to retain (Clemens, 2002).  
Clemens work is the most recent work identified in the literature dealing with the 
non-monetary factors affecting retention in the junior SWO. 
F. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE SWO INCENTIVES  
In 2006, Filip conducted an analysis of auction and signaling theory to 
develop parameters in which naval bonuses could be flexible, both in amount 
and time period which would further benefit the navy to provide signaling 
information. He theorized a cost savings to the Navy as bonuses would be better 
aligned and competitive with the overall job market (Filip, 2006).  
In 2012, Nowell expanded Filip’s research and applied it specifically to 
SWO retention. Nowell conducted a survey targeting junior officers at the rank of 
O-4 and below (2012). The junior officers focused on those soon to be eligible, 
currently eligible, or had already taken SWOCP. The survey included a sample 
frame of all junior SWO officers. The initial response rate was 19.23 percent and 
resulted in a useable sample size of 108. The survey asked what was the 
minimum financial bonus required for the junior officer to commit to two 
department head afloat tours (Nowell, 2012).  
To address retention quality, Nowell developed an individual quality score 
using the following traits:  
 total years active duty service,  
 number of deployments over 90 days completed,  
 number of different platforms served on,  
 completion of both an engineering and non-engineering tour,  
 personal awards and decorations, and  
 the average of two most recent FITREP MTAs.  
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Nowell then used this quality score in three auctions: a standard uniform 
price auction, and a quality adjusted discount auction (QUAD) to minimize cost, 
and a QUAD to maximize quantity; he found that the current SWOCP bonus 
resulted in over retention of junior officers (2012). Nowell identified self-selection 
bias of the voluntary survey as a potential explanation of his results (2012). 
However, the results found that in comparison, the other three simulations would 
retain the correct number, at a higher average quality and a lower total cost than 
the current system (Nowell, 2012).  
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IV. RETENTION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. RETENTION DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data used was obtained from Bureau of Naval Personnel in an 
inventory format. The data consisted of yearly inventories of SWOs by cohort 
stratified by gender. See Appendix A for data spreadsheets.  
B. TREATMENT OF DATA 
The initial decision point occurs at the end of the ADSO, or between years 
four and seven. Consequently, the area of interest is SWO retention in each of 
these four years. Pooling the data across all the 20 cohorts and four decision 
years yields a sample size of 74 cohort-years.  
Summary statistics for the three data sets of mixed, male, and female are 
shown in Tables 6–8. The tables show the retention rates for cohorts 1990–2009 
at specific YCS points. For example, in Table 6, the mean retention rate at year 
five is 83.10 percent, the median retention rate is 83.38 percent, the minimum 
retention rate is 74.51 percent, and the maximum retention rate is 99.06 percent; 
the standard deviation is 6.59 percent. The sample size is 19 because cohort 
2009 has not reached YCS five yet, so only cohorts 1990–2008 are included.    
Table 6.   Summary statistics for mixed dataset 
Retention Rates for cohorts 1990–2009 at YCS 4–7 





YCS 4 0.8606 0.8653 0.8009 0.9117 0.0293 20 
YCS 5 0.8310 0.8338 0.7451 0.9906 0.0559 19 
YCS 6 0.7907 0.7865 0.7367 0.8440 0.0324 18 
YCS 7 0.7590 0.7546 0.6512 0.8374 0.0435 17 
Pooled (YCS 4–





Table 7.   Summary statistics for male dataset  
Retention Rates for cohorts 1990–2009 at YCS 4–7 





YCS 4 0.8784 0.8794 0.8079 0.9938 0.0423 20 
YCS 5 0.8394 0.8560 0.6845 1.0000 0.0677 19 
YCS 6 0.8062 0.7978 0.7565 0.8764 0.0328 18 
YCS 7 0.7729 0.7612 0.6627 0.8393 0.0448 17 
Pooled (YCS 4–
7) 0.8241 0.8252 0.6627 1.0000 0.1135 74 
 
Table 8.   Summary statistics for female dataset  
Retention Rates for cohorts 1990–2009 at YCS 4–7 





YCS 4 0.8335 0.8291 0.7176 0.9630 0.0570 20 
YCS 5 0.7455 0.7384 0.5588 0.8636 0.0691 19 
YCS 6 0.7144 0.7091 0.5747 0.9500 0.0933 18 
YCS 7 0.6776 0.6960 0.4722 0.8261 0.1027 17 
Pooled (YCS 4–7) 0.7438 0.7500 0.4722 0.9630 0.1313 74 
 
 
1. Pooled Regression Analysis 
Pooled regression combines time-series and cross-sectional data to build 
a single model to describe an entire group rather than separate models to 
describe each individual year cross-sections. In this analysis, the focus was YCS 
four through seven allowing the applicable time series to be CY1994–2013. Each 
cohort was considered a cross-section so cohorts 1990–2009 were used. The 
data was then stacked by cross-section, or cohort. This pooled approach is 
particularly appropriate for this study because it mitigates the problem of small 




2. Assumption in Pooled Regression 
The equation that models pooled regression is built on the simple linear 
regression 
 Y X u    . (5) 
When pooling the regression, the equation would transform to  
 , , , , ,i t i t i t i t i tY X u      (6) 
where Yi,t = the scalar dependent variable, Xi,t is a vector of independent 
variables, and ui,t is the scalar disturbance for i cross-sections (cohorts 1990–
2009) and t time series (fourth year, fifth year, sixth year, and seventh year). 
However, this model creates more parameters than observations; it must be 
further simplified (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The first assumption in pooled 
regression is that the coefficients are equal for all individuals resulting in the 
simplification in the following equation. 
 , , ,i t i t i tY X u      (7) 
Because of equation (7), it must also be assumed the error variance is equal for 
each cross-section (Dielman 1989). 
C. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section develops the hypotheses to answer the primary and 
secondary research questions and provides the supporting rational.  
1. Hypothesis 1—First Primary Research Question 
In answering the first primary research question “Is there empirical 
evidence of a correlation between surface warfare officer retention and the 
economy?” hypothesis 1 (H1) is as follows:  
H1: Economic growth negatively impacts SWO retention. 
The primary reasoning was the ACOL I and II models. Using the equation  
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the right side variable represents the projected money stream in the civilian 
sector (Warner, 1984). Therefore, the underlying basis for hypothesis 1 is if the 
economy improves, the right hand side of the equation will grow by increasing 
the civilian monetary compensation Wj0 and therefore retention will decrease.5  
Specifically, as the economy increases, the availability of labor market 
participants decreases, leading to low unemployment. The low unemployment 
then leads to higher wages to address the employee shortages. This increase in 
wages and benefits entices SWOs to exit the Navy and pursue more lucrative 
income and benefit levels. 
2. Hypothesis 2—Second Primary Research Question 
In answering the second primary research question “Is there empirical 
evidence of a correlation between surface warfare officer retention and career 
pay?,” hypothesis 2 (H2) is as follows: 
H2: Career pay positively impacts SWO retention. 
The primary reasoning was based on research findings during the 
literature review. The SAG Corporation estimated a 10.5 percent increase in 
retention rates due to SWOCP using an inventory projection model (Mackin & 
Darling, 1996). Nosal predicted an increase in retention rate of 2.42 percent in 
YCS six due to SWOCP utilizing the ACOL method (1997).  
3. Hypothesis 3—Third Primary Research Question 
In answering the third primary research question “How does the surface 
warfare officer retention respond to the interaction between the economy and 
career pay?,” hypothesis 3 (H3) is as follows: 
                                            
5 In proving the ACOL model, Wj0 was estimated based on empirical data of 12,000 enlisted 
personnel that voluntarily separated (Warner, 1984).  
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H3: A downturn economy will increase the effectiveness of career pay on 
SWO retention. 
The rationale is that holding everything else constant, a recessive 
economy implies less opportunity outside the military and makes the additional 
monetary compensation of SWOCP more attractive and effective.  
4. Hypothesis 4—Secondary Research Question 
In answering the secondary research question “Do the findings (if any) 
vary with male or female SWO population?,” hypothesis 4 (H4) is as follows: 
H4: The explanatory variables will affect male and female datasets 
differently. 
The primary reasoning was based on the ACOL model. The ACOL model 
accounts for non-pecuniary variables. One can argue that male and female 
datasets would have different taste-factors for military and civilian life.  
D. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The following sections detail the univariate and multivariate statistical 
analysis to test H1–H4, beginning with a description of explanatory independent 
variables.  
1. Explanatory Independent Variables 
To test hypothesis 1, several economic indicators were examined. See 
Appendix B for historical data. 
 real annual GDP growth rate in 2009 dollars  
 annual Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) change as defined by 
end of year gain or loss over the beginning of the year opening. 
 annual National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ) change as defined by end of year gain or 
loss over the beginning of the year opening.  
 annual Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P500) change as defined by 
end of year gain or loss over the beginning of the year opening. 
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 annual unadjusted unemployment rate as reported by the United 
States Department of Labor 
 expansion variable as reported by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (1=expansion, 0=recession) 
To test hypothesis 2, the following explanatory variable was examined: 
 binary bonus variable defined as 1=bonus available, 0=bonus not 
available. 
To test hypothesis 3, the following explanatory variable was examined: 
 interaction of economy as defined by the unemployment rate 
multiplied by the bonus variable 
To test hypothesis 4, all of the preceding explanatory variable were used. 
The summary statistics for the non-binary summary statistics are shown in 
Table 9. The statistics found in Table 9 provide a macro-economic view of the 
external environment for SWOs. The average growth rate of GDP for the time 
period is 2.55 percent, while the growth of DJIA is 9.07 percent, on average. 
Unemployment averaged 6.01 percent during the time period. Also given are the 
medians, minimums, maximums, and standard deviations for each economic 
indicator. All indicators spanned 1994–2013 for a sample size of 20. 
Table 9.   Summary statistics for non-binary explanatory economic 
variables 
Explanatory 





GDP 2.55% 2.81% -2.77% 5.00% 1.90% 20 
DJIA 9.07% 9.14% -33.84% 33.45% 16.70% 20 
S&P500 8.99% 13.10% -38.49% 34.11% 19.29% 20 
NASDAQ 13.32% 12.86% -40.54% 85.59% 31.84% 20 
Unemployment 





2. Univariate Analysis 
As a preliminary step, univariate analysis was conducted using the 
Pearson correlation, defined by 
     , , X Yx y
X Y X Y
E X Ycov X Y      
       (9) 
where cov is the covariance, σ is the standard deviation, µ is the mean and E is 
the expectation. The Pearson correlation measures the linear relationship 
between two populations based on sample statistics. The range is from negative 
one to one. Negative one indicates a perfectly inverse linear relationship between 
populations; when one rises, the other will fall by the same amount. Positive one 
indicates a perfect linear relationship; when one rises, the other will rise by the 
same amount. Zero represents no relationship at all.  
To support H1, the economic indicators of GDP, DJIA, NASDAQ, S&P500, 
and the expansion variable should have a negative value, or an inverse 
relationship; the only positive correlation relationship should be with 
unemployment rate–the only negative economic indicator. 
A summary of results is shown in Table 10. For example, YCS-7, spanning 
cohorts 1990–2006, had a 0.1251 correlation with DJIA for the same time period.  
Table 10.   Summary of Pearson Correlation 
Retention 
Rate 
GDP DJIA NASDAQ S&P500 U Rate Expansion 
YCS 4 0.0891 0.0177 0.0378 -0.1849 -0.0266 0.1749 
YCS 5 0.2883 0.1449 0.2527 0.0003 0.0879 0.2421 
YCS 6 0.0668 -0.1422 -0.1834 -0.2061 0.1304 -0.0771 
YCS 7 0.0822 0.1251 0.1868 0.1657 0.5255^ 0.2845 
Pooled 0.1282 0.0772 0.1014 -0.0102 0.1211 0.1417 
Note: H1is a directional hypothesis; (+) indicates significance at 10% level, (^) 
indicates significance at 5% level, and (*) indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
 
Based on directional significance, the only noteworthy correlation is YCS-7 
and unemployment rate. This means for cohorts, when at their seven YCS, there 
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is a positive correlation between unemployment rate and retention rate; 
specifically, when unemployment rate rises so does retention rate and the 
reciprocal is true when unemployment rate declines.   
3. Multivariate Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis allows for the simultaneous analysis of 
several independent explanatory variables on one or more dependent variables. 
The method used in the following models is the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method. This method calculates the statistical significance of each independent 
variable, and measures the effect on the dependent variable as shown in the 
coefficient. The goal of OLS is to minimize the sum of squared errors in a 
regression. YCS is used in every model as a control variable to account for 
phase cross-section in the pooled data.  
Tables 11–13 summarize the OLS results for H1–H4. The first row shows 
YCS as the control variable. The subsequent rows show data for specific 
independent variables assessed. The top number for each variable indicates the 
coefficient or the incremental effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable (retention rate). The indicator on the coefficient shows the statistical 
significance of the coefficient; (+) indicates significance at 10 percent level, (^) 
indicates significance at five percent level, and (*) indicates significance at 1 
percent level. The bottom number shown for each variable is the T-statistic. The 
last row shows the R squared, which explains how much variance can be 
explained by the model. The indicator shows how statistically significant the 
overall model is.  
a. Mixed Data Set Analysis 
Table 11 shows the results for the mixed data set. The statistically 
significant variables were the unemployment rate and the bonus when analyzed 
with the interaction to unemployment rate.  
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Table 11.   OLS coefficients and T-stat for mixed data set 
H1 H2 H3 
YCS 
-0.0351* -0.0352* 0.9995* -0.0353* 0.9777* -0.0351* -0.0347* -0.0347* 
-8.3718 -8.3046 42.4331 -8.3322 34.9223 -8.4101 -8.2336 -8.1833 
GDP 
0.3134               
1.2594               
DJIA 
  0.0146             
  0.5013             
S&P500 
    0.0229           
    0.9226           
NASDAQ 
      -0.0039         
      -0.2589         
U-Rate 
        0.4145+       
        1.5555       
Expansion 
Variable 
          0.0187     
          1.4793     
Bonus 
            -0.0134 -0.0536* 
            -1.2222 -2.5393 
Interaction 
              0.6296* 
              2.2077 
Model Fit 
(R2) 0.5050* 0.4958* 0.5000* 0.4944* 0.5106* 0.5091* 0.5044* 0.5367* 
Note: H1-H3 are directional hypothesis; (+) indicates significance at 10% level, (^) indicates 
significance at 5% level, and (*) indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
 
(1) Mixed Data Set—H1 
With unemployment as an economic indicator, a one percent increase in 
the unemployment rate leads to a statistically significant increase of 0.4145 
percent in the retention rate. Therefore, H1 is supported when unemployment 
rate is used as the proxy for the economy. However, there is no similar evidence 
when other proxies for the economy are used. Overall, the outcome is that using 
unemployment as a proxy for the economy is the only proxy that supports H1: 
Economic growth negatively impacts SWO retention. 
(2) Mixed Data Set—H2 
In regard to H2, the coefficient of the bonus variable is insignificant. 
Hence, there is insufficient evidence to support H2, and we reject the conjecture 
that career pay positively impacts SWO retention.  
 32
There are two possible explanations for the finding on H2. The first is 
there is indeed no correlation among the SWO retention and SWOCP when 
controlling for YCS. The second, alternative possibility is that in actuality the 
correlation exists, yet the test does not have sufficient sample size and hence 
lacks power to detect the correlation. This is typically referred to in statistics as a 
type II error, failing to reject a false null hypothesis (i.e., a false negative). 
Increasing the sample size would allow for analysis to determine if this 
conclusion was due to type II error or if the null hypothesis of no correlation was 
indeed accurate.  
(3) Mixed Data Set—H3 
H3 predicts a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term, 
which is supported. The interaction term coefficient has a magnitude of 0.6296, 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. Given the counterintuitive negative 
coefficient for the bonus variable, an unemployment rate of 8.513 percent would 
turn the bonus variable to become a positive determinant of SWO retention. 
Therefore, we accept H3, a downturn economy will increase the effectiveness of 
career pay on SWO retention.  
b. Male Data Set Analysis 
Table 12 shows the results for the male data set. Similar conclusions from 
the mixed data set are drawn; the statistically significant variables were the 
unemployment rate and the bonus when analyzed with the interaction to 







Table 12.   OLS coefficients and T-stat for male data set 
H1 H2 H3 
YCS 
-0.0359* -0.0359* -0.0359* -0.0361* -0.0362* -0.0359* -0.0360* -0.0360* 
-7.2280 -7.2068 -7.2350 -7.2268 -7.4064 -7.2575 -7.1832 -7.1547 
GDP 
0.2262               
0.7673               
DJIA 
  0.0211             
  0.6153             
S&P500 
    0.0271           
    0.9282           
NASDAQ 
      -0.0006         
      -0.0332         
U-Rate 
        0.0055*       
        1.7789       
Expansion 
Variable 
          0.0166     
          1.1104     
Bonus 
            -0.0003 -0.0421+ 
            -0.0251 -1.6629 
Interaction 
              0.0065^ 
              1.9132 
Model Fit 
(R2) 0.4286* 0.4269* 0.4308* 0.4239* 0.4484* 0.4337* 0.4239* 0.4525* 
Note: H1-H3 are directional hypothesis; (+) indicates significance at 10% level, (^) indicates 
significance at 5% level, and (*) indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
 
(1) Male Data Set—H1 
While statistically significant, a one percent increase in the unemployment 
rate leads to a 0.0055 percent increase in the retention rate. Therefore, H1 is still 
supported in the male data set, though the magnitude of the effect is reduced in 
when compared to the mixed data set. As with the mixed data set, there is no 
similar evidence when other proxies for the economy are used. Overall, the 
outcome is that using unemployment as a proxy for the economy is the only 
proxy that supports H1: Economy growth negatively impacts SWO retention in 
the male population. 
(2) Male Data Set—H2 
Similar to the mixed data set, the coefficient of the bonus variable is 
insignificant. Hence, there is insufficient evidence to support H2, and we reject 
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the conjecture that career pay positively impacts SWO retention in the male 
population. 
(3) Male Data Set—H3 
The male data set continues to trend with the mixed data set. Similar to 
the mixed data set, the bonus variable has a negative coefficient, which is 
counterintuitive because it states that the application of the bonus causes lower 
retention. However, the ratio between the coefficient of the bonus (-.0421) and 
the interaction variable (.0065) is 6.4770. When applied to the OLS equation, this 
states that a 647.70 percent increase in unemployment rate will overcome the 
negative effect of SWOCP. Therefore, we statistically accept H3, a downturn 
economy will increase the effectiveness of career pay on SWO retention, though 
the economic significance of unemployment rate on the effectiveness of bonus is 
questionable.  
As shown in the discussion of H1 for the male data set, the unemployment 
had less effect on the male data set alone. This continued to impact the 
interaction variable, as unemployment rate was the economic indicator used in 
the interaction. One possible reason for the skewed magnitudes between the 
mixed and male data set is the reduction in sample size. More robust data would 
allow for deeper analysis and increase the power of the statistical analysis. 
c. Female Data Set Analysis 
Referencing Table 13 for the female dataset, there are deviations from the 






Table 13.   OLS coefficients and T-stat for female data set 
H1 H2 H3 
YCS 
-0.0500* -0.0450* -0.0501* -0.0505* -0.0507* -0.0503* -0.0484* -0.0484* 
-5.9472 -5.8453 -5.8959 -5.8747 -5.8559 -5.8794 -5.7767 -5.7429 
GDP 
1.0814^               
2.1667               
DJIA 
  0.0912+             
  1.5522             
S&P500 
    0.0890^           
    1.7764           
NASDAQ 
      0.0379         
      1.2557         
U-Rate 
        0.0036       
        0.6446       
Expansion 
Variable 
          0.0383+     
          1.4773     
Bonus 
            -0.0534* -0.0582* 
            -2.4468 -2.3436 
Interaction 
              0.0117^ 
              2.0598 
Model Fit 
(R2) 0.3658* 0.3461* 0.3526* 0.3386* 0.3278* 0.3440* 0.3765* 0.4121* 
Note: H1-H3 are directional hypothesis; (+) indicates significance at 10% level, (^) indicates 
significance at 5% level, and (*) indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
 
(1) Female Data Set—H1 
In the female data set, using unemployment rate as an economic proxy is 
rejected based on significance level. GDP, DJIA and S&P500 are all significant 
economic indicators, but the signs are counterintuitive to the hypothesis. 
Therefore, H1 not supported and there is insufficient evidence that economic 
growth negatively impacts SWO retention in the female data set.  
(2) Female Data Set —H2 
In regard to H2, the female population differs from both the mixed and 
male populations. Table 13 shows a significant bonus variable. However, it is 
also counterintuitive. The negative sign indicating that the bonus has a negative 
impact on female SWO retention. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence to 
support H2, that career pay positively affects the female SWO population.  
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(3) Female Data Set—H3 
The female data set is similar to the mixed and male data sets in regard to 
H3. The bonus variable remains negative, which is counterintuitive. However, the 
ratio between the coefficient of the bonus (-.0582) and the interaction variable 
(.0177) is 4.9744. When applied to the OLS equation, this states that a 497.44 
percent increase in unemployment rate will overcome the negative effect of 
SWOCP. Therefore, we statistically accept H3, a downturn economy will increase 
the effectiveness of career pay on SWO retention though the economic 
significance of unemployment rate on the effectiveness of bonus is questionable.  
As shown in the discussion of H3 for the male data set, one possible 
reason for the skewed magnitudes between the mixed and female data set is the 
reduction in sample size. More robust data would allow for deeper analysis and 
increase the power of the statistical analysis. 
d. Hypothesis 4 Analysis 
The male data set was similar to the mixed data set though the statistically 
significant factors had less effect on the male subset. The female subset had 
unique results from the mixed and male subset and therefore H4 is supported: 
the explanatory variables affect male and female datasets differently. 
Of note, the factors found to be statistically significant in the female subset 
are counter-intuitive. This may be due to both insufficient sample size resulting in 
type II errors or based on the overall small size of the female population. The 
female population examined in this data accounts for only 13.64 percent of the 
SWO population. A summation of expected coefficient signs and model results is 
















GDP (-) (+) (+)  (+)^ 
DJIA (-) (+) (+)  (+)+ 
S&P500 (-) (+) (+)  (+)^ 
NASDAQ (-) (-) (-) (+) 
U Rate (+)  (+)+  (+)*  (+) 
Expansion  (-) (+) (+)  (+)+ 
Bonus (+) (-) (-)  (-)* 
Interaction (+)  (+)*  (+)^  (+)^ 
Note: One (+) indicates a confidence interval of 10% or 
less, (^) indicates a confidence interval of 5% or less, 
and (*) indicates a confidence interval of less than 1%. 
 
e. Multivariate Summary 
The results from the multivariate analysis are summarized in Table 15. 
Table 15.   Summary of multivariate analysis 







1% increase in 
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1% increase in 
unemployment 
results in .0055% 
increase in 
retention 
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*The change in magnitude between the mixed and the 
male/female data sets may be stem from a low power error 




As found in H1, the economic growth 
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 Mixed Data Set Male Data Set Female Data Set 
variables will 




indicators were statistically different 
between the male and female data 
sets, and H3 affects the  
 
E. RE-EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHESES 
To further examine the correlation to the economy, the independent 
economic variables were lagged and transformed in several ways and no further 
correlations were found. Furthermore, additional independent variables such as 
the annualized personal savings rate, the velocity of money, and the federal 
interest rate were examined and also failed to produce any correlations.  
To further examine the correlation of retention to SWOCP, a simple T-test 
of the means between the no SWOCP and SWOCP groups were applied. Table 
16 shows the average retention rates and standard deviation for each group 
based on cohorts 1990–2009 and YCS 4–7 data, and also separates by gender. 
Table 16.   Retention Averages and Standard deviations for Combined 
Data set, Male Dataset and Female Dataset. 
All Data 
 Average Standard Deviation P-Values 
No SWOCP 82.79% 6.84% 0.13 
SWOCP 80.49% 5.14% 
Male Data 
No SWOCP 83.19% 7.32% 0.54 
SWOCP 82.16% 5.88% 
Female Data 
No SWOCP 79.44% 11.16% .01 
SWOCP 72.75% 9.12% 
 
Based on the P-values and a significance level of 10 percent, SWOCP 
only had an effect on the female population, as previously determined. 
Furthermore, it is shows once again that SWOCP has a negative effect on 
female SWO retention.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATION 1 
The analysis in Chapter IV demonstrated that unemployment rate is 
statistically significant on SWO retention. Retention rate is higher when 
unemployment rate is higher. This evidence is consistent with hypothesis 1 (H1) 
that economic growth negatively impact retention; however, caution should be 
exercised in interpreting this finding because there is insufficient support of H1 
using alternative economic indicators.  
Because evidence of H1 is mixed, more research on the non-monetary 
determinants of SWO retention is recommended. In his analysis of junior surface 
warfare officer retention in 1997, Du Monte analyzed resignation surveys and 
found the top six reasons for separation at that time were all non-monetary; the 
reasons, in decreasing order of importance, were (Du Monte 1997, p. 28): 
 amount of family separation,  
 promotion and advancement opportunity,  
 enjoyment from job,  
 job fulfillment/challenge,  
 amount of sea duty, and  
 fairness in performance evaluations (Du Mont, 1997, p. 28).  
Rear Admiral Natter, Lieutenant (LT) Lopez, and LT Hodges (1998) again 
stressed the factors affecting junior SWO retention: 
 Loss of job satisfaction,  
 Self-inflicted pain (i.e., extraneous paperwork and inspections), 
 Micro-Management, 
 Lack of confidence in senior leaders, and  
 The erosion of benefits. (Natter, Lopez, & Hodges, 1998).  
Admiral Natter et al. (1998) specified the erosion of benefits was the “tie-
breaker.” They elaborated that in addition to direct financial compensation, junior 
officers felt reduction in special pays and incentives was indicative of under-
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appreciation. Natter et al. (1998) also notes that the change in family makeup is 
significant. The early 1980s time frame had a married officer corps of 
approximately 30 percent; in the late 1990s, this had grown to 70 percent (Natter, 
et al., 1998). This indicates a shifting of priorities among junior officers (Natter, et 
al. 1998). More recently, Stoker and Crawford (2008) analyzed resignation 
surveys and found family related factors and leadership/cultural issues to be 
among the top concerns.6  
The Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) manpower group has been 
actively assessing junior SWO accessions. They conducted a series of surveys 
in 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2013 (Surface Warfare Enterprise, 2013). 
The SWE found the top two reasons negatively affecting retention in both 2008 
and 2013 were workload and strain on family (i.e., separation).7 Another 
comparison SWE found was that it was not necessarily the Navy that SWOs 
chose to leave; rather, it was the SWO life they rejected. Figure 4 from SWE’s 
study, shows the magnitude of respondents who would make the navy a career 
compared to the reduced numbers on the right that show the number of 
respondents who would be a career SWO (Surface Warfare Enterprise, 2013).  
                                            
6 Military pay was more important to men than women but was still not among the top 
reasons for separation. 
7 The remaining factors in 2013 were: “micromanagement, inability to start/grow a family, 
quality of leadership, lack of incentive for outperforming peers, and zero defects mentality” 
(Surface Warfare Enterprise, 2013). 
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Figure 4.  2013 Junior Officer SWE survey results comparing general Naval 
career to SWO naval career (from Surface Warfare Enterprise, 2013)  
The SWE’s study also asked those that indicated they were going to leave 
the navy to what extent each of the following five factors influenced their 
decision. These five factors are: the work load during pre-deployment periods, 
micromanagement by superiors, the strain on family life/or family separation, 
balancing the Navy’s need’s with spouse’s needs, and ability to start or grow a 
family. Figure 5 (Surface Warfare Enterprise, 2013) shows the results.  
 
 
Figure 5.  2013 Junior officer SWE survey results to influencers of decision 
to leave active duty (from Surface Warfare Enterprise, 2013) 
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The results indicated the work-load during pre-deployment periods was 
the most significant overall, but strain on family life/or family separation was a 
large influencer for those that were married or with dependents. The female 
population also indicated a statistically significant higher concern with the ability 
to start or grow a family as compared to the male population.   
To summarize, the extant literature and the empirical findings in this thesis 
seems to suggest that the non-monetary factors, as opposed to monetary ones, 
are the first-order determinants of SWO retention. If retention is to be adequately 
addressed, the focus needs to reside in quality of life issues.  
B. RECOMMENDATION 2 
Subject to the caveat of a low power test, Chapter IV demonstrated that 
SWOCP, at its current magnitude and schedule, does not positively impact 
retention. Of note, the only dataset that it was a significant factor for indicated a 
negative impact. Consequently, it is recommended to conduct a policy 
reassessment of SWOCP. Two possible considerations are to discontinue 
SWOCP or attempt to increase the effectiveness of SWOCP through change of 
either magnitude or schedule or both. Since FY2000, Bureau of Naval Personnel 
data indicates 2,599 SWOs have accepted the SWOCP. This totals 
$194,925,000, or $255,520,320 in 2014 dollars using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation. Discontinuing SWOCP would result in 
an annual saving of up to $20,625,000 (based on 275 department head billets 
available).  
Furthermore, personnel anecdotal evidence indicates low value for 
SWOCP. As a SWO at this decision point, my experience with my peers has 
shown three possible scenarios:  
 SWOs that love the job appreciate the bonus but it has no effect in 
their decision, 
 SWOs that are on the margin are more affected by tantalizing shore 
tours (specific location, job, or degree opportunity) than SWOCP, 
and  
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 SWOs that have a high dislike for non-monetary factors and make 
their retention decisions independently of any bonus—regardless of 
the amount. 
The above factors also further support recommendation 1 to address non-
monetary factors. 
Conversely, to increase the effectiveness of SWOCP, a change in 
SWOCP amount or pay schedule may be beneficial. Currently, SWOCP is paid 
over the course of six years; something as simple as providing a lump sum 
choice may increase the psychological affect an incentive has. Specifically, an 
officer who accepted SWOCP in 2008 received $72,196.48 in 2008 dollars when 
paid over the course of six years. An additional cost to the Department of the 
Navy (DoN) of $2,803.52 per SWO (the time value of money associated with not 
stretching it over six years) who accepted SWOCP in 2008 may result in 
increased retention.   
Also, an increase in SWOCP to improve effectiveness may be justified by 
a thorough cost-benefit analysis. The largest cost in low retention rate is the 
training invested in SWOs. Gavino (2002) found the average training cost for 
SWOs is $99,143 per SWO in FY2003 dollars (p. 32). Macaluso (2011) found 
training costs to be $100,877 in FY2011 dollars.8 The average YCS1 inventory 
from 2000–2010 was 852 while the average SWOCP takers in the same time 
period was 236, resulting in a yearly average differential of 616 SWOs. Using 
Macaluso’s (2011) more conservative cost estimate this results in an average 
annual loss of $65,708,424 in training investment not recouped by the navy (in 
FY2014 dollars).9 Retaining three more SWOs may justify an increase in over 
$10,000 in SWOCP.  
                                            
8 In 2002, the Navy instituted a new training cycle for SWOs that consisted primarily of on-
the-job training versus a six-month formal school prior to the first duty station. 
9 This number may be inflated, as SWOs in cohort 2009 have one more year to decide to 
take SWOCP, and cohort 2010 have two more years. Calculating using cohorts 2000–2008 
results in an average differential of 575 SWOs and an annual loss in training of $61,332,822 
(FY2014 dollars).  
 44
C. RECOMMENDATION 3 
Finally, there is some evidence to indicate the female population does not 
follow the same retention trends as the male population. The female population 
on average for the cohorts and YCS examined accounts for 13.64 percent of the 
total SWO population. Overall, the female SWO population accounts for 
approximately 17 percent (Miller, n.d.). Furthermore, the SWO community has 
the highest female population of all the URL communities and should not be 
ignored in retention policy analysis. Figure 6, excerpted from Miller, shows the 
female population trends over the URL communities.10 Further research specific 
toward female retention is recommended (Miller, n.d.).   
 
 
Figure 6.  Distribution of female officers in URL communities (from Miller, 
n.d.) 
                                            
10 The first year to allow female officers to begin schooling for the sub-surface community 
was 2010. The special warfare community is still restricted for females.  
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D. SUMMARY 
Retaining junior SWOs has been a long-term issue. This thesis and extant 
literature show that the economy and financial indicators may have less effect 
than previously modeled. Future research should focus on the non-monetary 
factors, re-assessing SWOCP, and directing efforts aimed at female retention.  
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APPENDIX A. RETENTION INVENTORY SPREADSHEET 
 
 
Figure 7.  Mixed retention data spreadsheet 
 
 
Figure 8.  Male retention data spreadsheet 
 
Figure 9.  Female retention data spreadsheet 
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APPENDIX B. EXPLANATORY VARIABLE HISTORICAL DATA 
Table 17.   GDP (after “U.S. GDP Growth Rate by Year,” n.d) and 
unemployment rate from 1994–2013 (after “Labor Force 
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, n.d) 
Year 
Annualized Real  




1994 4.13 6.1 
1995 2.28 5.6 
1996 4.45 5.4 
1997 4.39 4.9 
1998 5 4.5 
1999 4.69 4.2 
2000 2.89 4.0 
2001 0.21 4.7 
2002 2.04 5.8 
2003 4.36 6.0 
2004 3.12 5.5 
2005 3.03 5.1 
2006 2.39 4.6 
2007 1.87 4.6 
2008 -2.77 5.8 
2009 -0.24 9.3 
2010 2.73 9.6 
2011 1.68 8.9 
2012 1.6 8.1 
2013 3.13 7.4 
Table 18.   Dow Jones Industrial Average data from 1994–2013 (from 
“Dow Jones Industrial Average Yearly Returns,” n.d)  
Year Beginning Price Ending Price Gain or Loss Percent Gain or Loss 
1994 3754.09 3834.44 80.35 2.14% 
1995 3834.44 5117.12 1282.68 33.45% 
1996 5117.12 6448.27 1331.15 26.01% 
1997 6448.27 7908.25 1459.98 22.64% 
1998 7908.25 9181.43 1273.18 16.10% 
1999 9181.43 11497.12 2315.69 25.22% 
2000 11497.12 10786.85 -710.27 -6.18% 
2001 10786.85 10021.5 -765.35 -7.10% 
2002 10021.5 8341.63 -1679.87 -16.76% 
2003 8341.63 10453.92 2112.29 25.32% 
2004 10453.92 10783.01 329.09 3.15% 
2005 10783.01 10717.5 -65.51 -0.61% 
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Year Beginning Price Ending Price Gain or Loss Percent Gain or Loss 
2006 10717.5 12463.15 1745.65 16.29% 
2007 12463.15 13264.82 801.67 6.43% 
2008 13264.8 8776.39 -4488.43 -33.84% 
2009 8776.39 10428.05 1651.66 18.82% 
2010 10428.05 11577.51 1149.46 11.02% 
2011 11577.51 12217.56 640.05 5.53% 
2012 12217.56 13104.14 886.58 7.26% 
2013 13104.14 16576.66 3472.52 26.50% 
Table 19.   NASDAQ data from 1994–2013 (from “NASDAQ Composite 
Index Yearly Returns,” n.d.) 
Year Beginning Price Ending Price Gain or Loss Percent Gain or Loss 
1994 776.8 751.96 -24.84 -3.20% 
1995 751.96 1052.13 300.17 39.92% 
1996 1052.13 1291.03 238.9 22.71% 
1997 1291.03 1570.35 279.32 21.64% 
1998 1570.35 2192.69 622.34 39.63% 
1999 2192.69 4069.31 1876.62 85.59% 
2000 4069.31 2470.52 -1598.79 -39.29% 
2001 2470.52 1950.4 -520.12 -21.05% 
2002 1950.4 1335.51 -614.89 -31.53% 
2003 1335.51 2003.37 667.86 50.01% 
2004 2003.37 2175.44 172.07 8.59% 
2005 2175.44 2205.32 29.88 1.37% 
2006 2205.32 2415.29 209.97 9.52% 
2007 2415.29 2652.28 236.99 9.81% 
2008 2652.28 1577.03 -1075.25 -40.54% 
2009 1577.03 2269.15 692.12 43.89% 
2010 2269.15 2652.87 383.72 16.91% 
2011 2652.87 2605.15 -47.72 -1.80% 
2012 2605.15 3019.51 414.36 15.91% 
2013 3019.51 4176.59 1157.08 38.32% 
Table 20.   S&P500 data from 1994–2013 (from “S&P 500 Index Yearly 
Returns,” n.d) 
Year Beginning Price Ending Price Gain or Loss Percent Gain or Loss 
1994 466.45 459.27 -7.18 -1.54% 
1995 459.27 615.93 156.66 34.11% 
1996 615.93 740.74 124.81 20.26% 
1997 740.74 970.43 229.69 31.01% 
1998 970.43 1229.23 258.8 26.67% 
1999 1229.23 1469.25 240.02 19.53% 
2000 1469.25 1320.28 -148.97 -10.14% 
2001 1320.28 1148.08 -172.2 -13.04% 
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Year Beginning Price Ending Price Gain or Loss Percent Gain or Loss 
2002 1148.08 879.82 -268.26 -23.37% 
2003 879.82 1111.92 232.1 26.38% 
2004 1111.92 1211.92 100 8.99% 
2005 1211.92 1248.29 36.37 3.00% 
2006 1248.29 1418.3 170.01 13.62% 
2007 1418.3 1468.36 50.06 3.53% 
2008 1468.36 903.25 -565.11 -38.49% 
2009 903.25 1115.1 211.85 23.45% 
2010 1115.1 1257.64 142.54 12.78% 
2011 1257.64 1257.6 -0.04 0.00% 
2012 1257.6 1426.19 168.59 13.41% 
2013 1426.19 1848.36 422.17 29.60% 
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